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Gentrification has become a global phenomenon. However, its different forms and social 
consequences in East Asian contexts are not particularly well known. Although the term 
of gentrification is relatively new, many urban policies in the developmental states in 
East Asia have attempted to promote gentrification. This paper investigates how the 
developmental states in East Asia have adopted the idea of gentrification in their urban 
renewal policies. The development of urban renewal policy and state intervention in 
Korea is taken as an empirical framework. An insight into how the state has achieved 
urban renewal through the interaction of the public sector, private sector and 
community. This investigation of the development of urban renewal policy in Korea 
illustrates how the concept of „gentrification‟ has been formed in the different cultural 
environments of the East and the West. 
 





The last four decades have seen a wide range of debates concerning changes in housing 
class, which involves the displacement of the working class by the middle class. In recent 
years, it appears that the gentrification debate has lost its radical, challenging and 
transformatory edge as the nature of gentrification has changed. The idea of 
gentrification related to social structural change and collective action in opposition to the 
state are rather out of fashion. There has been a good deal of discussion about 
gentrification in Western cities, however, its different forms and social consequences in 
East Asian contexts are not particularly well known. 
 
With its extraordinary economic success, cities in South Korea (hereafter Korea), 
especially Seoul, have undergone tremendous state-led urban change resulting in the 
mass displacement of low-income households. In Korea, the developmental state has 
held a large degree of power and been heavily involved in urban restructuring. This high 
degree of state intervention, however, was not intended primarily to benefit those who 
were excluded from the changing economic and social structure. Urban renewal projects 
were pursued to support continuous physical expansion and economic prosperity for 
middle and upper-middle income households rather than low-income households. The 
Korean government encouraged high-density redevelopment in urban renewal projects 
to solve the chronic housing shortage as part of the expansion of home-ownership. To 
revitalise disadvantaged neighbourhoods, the state facilitated gentrification with an 
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increased role for the private sector. This meant that the state became a facilitator who 
sought to create favorable conditions for the private sector to invest in urban areas. 
Though not consciously or explicitly so, the idea of gentrification was embraced by the 
government as an urban renewal solution. This state-facilitated gentrification has 
brought about significant physical improvements in disadvantaged neighbourhoods but 
has brought little benefit to the poor in those areas.  
 
This paper begins by exploring the emergence of gentrification in Western cities focusing 
on the conceptual evolution of gentrification. It then investigates how the developmental 
states in East Asia have adopted the idea of gentrification in their urban renewal policies. 
The development of urban renewal policy and state intervention in Korea is taken as an 
empirical framework. An insight into how the state has achieved urban renewal through 
the interaction of the public sector, private sector and community. This investigation of 
the development of urban renewal policy in Korea illustrates how the concept of 




Since the British sociologist Ruth Glass first coined the term „gentrification‟ in 1964, 
there has been on-going debate on its causes, consequences and significance in different 
parts of the world. Gentrification is no longer restricted to old industrialised Western 
cities but it has been a global phenomenon (Atkinson and Bridge 2005; Butler 2007; He 
2007; Lees et al. 2008; Slater 2006; 2011; Smith 2002). Despite gentrification receiving 
widespread recognition, the concept is not easily defined as it means different things 
according to different people, places and times. 
 
In the West, gentrification was initially seen as the urban class change process of the 
replacement of the original working class occupiers by middle class homebuyers. It 
occurred mainly because of changes in locational preferences of the middle class, so-
called „urban pioneers‟, who risked themselves and transformed an undesirable 
neighbourhood into a good place to live. During the first wave of gentrification, following 
Neil Smith‟s schematic history of gentrification (2001), the activities of gentrifiers were 
limited to small inner-city neighbourhoods. They were funded significantly by the public 
sector as the private sector was not confident enough to get involved in the rehabilitation 
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process of inner-city neighbourhoods (Beauregard 1986; Smith 1979; 2001). State 
intervention was direct and it played an active role in gentrification.  
 
In the second wave, which occurred in the late 1970s, gentrification began to be 
understood in a much broader context (Smith and Williams 1986). As old cities, mostly 
in the north eastern USA and Western Europe, which had experienced the loss of 
population and jobs and the deterioration of inner-city housing, strived to revitalise 
inner city areas through public and private partnerships to attract the middle class, 
gentrification was integrated into a wider process of social, economic and urban 
regeneration (Sassen 2001). The 1980s saw large-scale luxury office, hotel, shopping 
district and residential developments and gentrification was evident in the process of 
these redevelopments. The role of the state was downplayed and more emphasis was 
given to the opportunities for the private sector to contribute to gentrification. 
Confronted with the declining profitability of traditional mass-production industries and 
an increasing dissatisfaction with the high cost of state expenditure on welfare, the 
blame was laid on Keynesian financial intervention, state ownership and overregulated 
labour markets (Peck and Tickell 2002). There was a desire to roll back the state and 
create opportunities for the private market among old industrialised countries (Conway 
2000; Duffy and Hutchinson 1997; Oatley 1998). A shift from government to market 
forces and partnership-based forms of governance were observed. North American and 
West European governments sought the mobilisation and extension of market 
mechanisms to alleviate economic and social problems.  
 
The third wave of gentrification, which began in the mid-1990s, was seen very differently 
from that in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The scale of gentrification expanded greatly. The 
link between gentrification and global systems of real estate and banking finance were 
extended and intensified (Shaw 2005; Hackworth 2002; Smith 2001; Lees et al. 2008). 
Hackworth (2002) and Smith (2001) observed four features of the third wave of 
gentrification distinct from earlier phases. First, gentrification expanded both within the 
inner-city neighbourhoods and to more remote neighbourhoods. It was gradually 
acknowledged that the gentrification process occurred not only in inner-city areas but 
also in rural villages although there were some differences in the character of 
gentrification between cities and other places (Clark 2005; Darling 2005; Philips 2002). 
Second, effective resistance to gentrification declined. After the economic crisis in the 
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early 1990s, a new approach, different from the „entrepreneurial‟ culture of the 1980s, 
was taken by the governments in many parts of the world (Peck and Tickell 2002, 37). 
Although market-led economic growth was still pursued as the most effective way to 
overcome local economic and social disadvantage, the idea of a more inclusive approach 
to local economic development and regeneration began to evolve. Castree (2008, 142) 
and McCarthy and Prudham (2004, 276) observed that the state demonstrated 
increasing interest in strategies to promote the involvement of civil society groups as a 
remedy for some of the previous failures of the system. The most active anti-
gentrification groups of the 1980s were invited to work as housing service providers to 
share in the decision making process which affected their lives (Hackworth, 2002; 
Smith, 2001). Third, the state was more involved in the process than during the second 
wave. The state became an enabler who sought to create favourable conditions for the 
private sector to invest in urban areas. City centres and city living, which drew together 
investment in retail, leisure and city centre housing, were regarded as engines for 
economic growth. Fourth, larger developers were the first to mobilise reinvestment in 
gentrifying neighbourhoods. The provision of small residential flats and „lofts‟ in city 
centres became a major urban phenomenon in virtually every major city. According to 
Hackworth (2002, 839), gentrification in the third wave became “more corporate, more 
state facilitated, and less resisted than ever before”.   
 
As we have seen, the concept of gentrification has broadened since the 1960s from small 
inner-city neighbourhoods led by a few affluent professionals who desired to live in the 
city to wider geographical boundaries being orchestrated by large developers linked to a 
global financial system. Eric Clark defined a broad concept of gentrification as  
“A process involving a change in the population of land-users such that the new 
users are of a higher socio-economic status than the previous users, together with 
an associated change in the built environment through a reinvestment in fixed 
capital” (2005, 258).  
It may be possible that in the face of the current global economic downturn a changed 
form of gentrification, conceivably a fourth wave, will emerge from the recession for the 
future. However, the core nature of gentrification – a social class change caused by a 
built environment transformation – is unlikely to change. As Slater et al. argued, 
“… we are seeing a new geography of gentrification, new forms of gentrification, 
such as „rural‟, „suburban‟, „new build‟, „super‟… but when we synthesise the recent 
scholarship, how can we think of gentrification as anything else but the production 
of space for – and consumption by – a more affluent and very different incoming 
population?” (2004, 1145). 
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Gentrification and the developmental states 
Relying on the broad definition of gentrification, it is found that many urban policies in 
the developmental states in East Asia have attempted to promote gentrification although 
the term of gentrification is relatively new (Fujitsuka 2005; Kim 2007). Terms like 
„housing improvement‟, „urban renewal‟ and „urban redevelopment‟ have been used in its 
place. Little literature exists concerning gentrification in East Asia but quite a few 
written works are found related to the displacement of the working class in the course of 
urban redevelopment.  
 
With their dramatic economic and social change over the last four to five decades, East 
Asian countries have undergone rampant urbanisation. According to UN world 
urbanisation prospects, in Korea, the proportion of the population in urban areas rose 
from 21.4 per cent in 1950 to 56.7 per cent in 1980 and to 83 per cent in 2010. During 
the same period, cities in Japan had a similar experience. China embarked on its rapid 
urbanisation in the 1990s and the urbanisation rate rose from 26.4 per cent in 1990 to 47 
per cent in 2010. The fast increase of urban population put stress on the demand for 
housing and thus the states accelerated large-scale construction of owner-occupied 
housing for the middle class. Many cities in East Asia have witnessed physical and social 
changes through dilapidated houses being replaced by large new residential buildings. 
The housing redevelopment and urban renewal projects have brought modernised 
infrastructures, improved living conditions, changed the images of cities and thus attract 
higher income newcomers. Nevertheless, there has been a large group of urban residents 
that has been left behind (Ha 2004; 2005; He 2007; Hirayama 2005; Ng 2002; Wang 
2003). Gentrification is apparent in this extensive housing redevelopment and urban 
renewal process (Chui 2008; Fujitsuka 2005; He 2007). 
 
The government in Western countries has also encouraged gentrification to some degree 
through its support for home-ownership such as the tax deduction for interest payments 
on mortgages (Beauregard 1986). However, the degree of state intervention in the 
gentrification process to support home-ownership is much higher in East Asia (Lee et al. 
2003; Ronald and Doling 2010; Shibata 2008). There have been significant regulations 
of land supply, policies designed to encourage larger and more efficient construction 
companies and considerable controls over the lending process. In Japan, for example, 
there have been increasing provisions of low-interest loans and improving lending 
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conditions to promote owner-occupied housing development (Hirayama 2005; 2007). 
The Japanese government has put strong emphasis on housing and urban 
redevelopment to stimulate the economy since the 1980s, especially after the bubble 
economy burst. To make building construction more flexible and expand potential 
building volume, the Urban Planning Law and the Building Code have been deregulated 
several times. This Japanese government‟s promotion of mass construction of 
condominiums has led to new „hot spots‟ in the central areas of big cities, especially in 
Tokyo (Hirayama 2005). Fujitsuka (2005, 143-145) argued that gentrification re-
emerged in the mid-1990s with the government‟s urban revitalisation policy. As 
Hirayama pointed out, “Essentially, hot spots were not born naturally but artificially 
created by the government policy to facilitate housing construction and urban 
redevelopment” (2005, 10).  
 
Similar phenomena have been found in other Asian cities including Shanghai and Seoul. 
He (2007) showed how the state played an indispensible role in initiating and facilitating 
gentrification with its privatisation and commercialisation policies using the case of 
Shanghai. In China, a new form of housing redevelopment, a kind of gentrification, has 
been shaped to meet the desire of the local state and private developers for economic and 
urban growth under market transition since the 1990s (He 2007; Wang 2003). Old inner 
city neighbourhoods have often been completely demolished and rebuilt into high-end 
commodity housing. The role of the state has been fundamental in this housing 
redevelopment process. The Korean government has also actively facilitated housing 
redevelopment and urban renewal projects to improve housing conditions and to 
increase the housing stock in big cities, especially Seoul, since the 1980s. The 
government acts as a facilitator, designating the housing redevelopment areas, 
authorising building removal and parcel assembly, and giving building permission to 
property owners. The capital is provided by developers. In most cases, the government‟s 
housing redevelopment and urban renewal strategies result in gentrification (Ha 2004, 
2005; Shin 2008).  
 
In East Asia, the traditional form of gentrification in Western countries, which involves 
the rehabilitation of architecturally attractive but unmaintained buildings in urban areas 
led by young professionals, has not often been seen (with the exception of Tokyo, see 
Sassen 2001). This may be due to the fact that, unlike many Western countries, most 
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cities in East Asia have had very little experience of urban decline because of 
deindustrialisation. Governments in East Asia have had to deal with problems of poor 
quality infrastructure and houses associated with rampant urbanisation. With rapid 
economic growth and development, traditional houses of urban areas have often been 
turned into high-rise flats. Gentrification has been evident in this large-scale housing 
redevelopment process to promote home-ownership for middle-class and wealthy 
residents, which is facilitated by the state as an urban strategy for economic and urban 
growth. Elite decision-makers have devised housing and urban policies to encourage 
gentrification and these pro-gentrification policies create optimal conditions for the 
private sector to invest in deprived neighbourhoods. While the scale and pace of 
gentrification may vary across East Asia, we can see a general trend that gentrification 
emerges mainly from a government‟s strong motivation to revitalise targeted parts of 
cities to meet a high demand for labour and housing created by a strong economy.  
 
Although the state in East Asia has been an interventionist, the dynamics of 
gentrification - the interdependency of the public sector, private sector and community – 
may have changed alongside social, economic and political changes, especially after the 
Asian Economic Crisis in 1997 and the recent Global Financial Crisis in 2008. Societies 
in East Asia have become increasingly democratised, deregulated and internationalised. 
Gentrification in East Asia should be understood in the context of these transformations.  
 
Gentrification in a developmental state: The case of Seoul, South Korea 
It is only in recent years that the Western concept of gentrification has been given some 
attention by geographers and city planners in Korea. However, that does not mean that, 
in practice, there has not been some form of gentrification. Korean cities have witnessed 
„state-facilitated‟ gentrification over the decades. The concept of gentrification has been 
well embraced by decision-makers, legislative representatives and planners as a viable 
option for the betterment of their cities and towns. However, it is still questionable 
whether the outcomes of gentrification are „good‟ or „bad‟ to society as a whole.  
 
Over the last 40 years, Seoul has been the most dominant city in modern Korea. Most 
economic and political bases have located in Seoul and, therefore, much of the growth 
and development of Seoul has occurred since the mid-1970s when Korea‟s economy 
showed remarkable growth. Seoul has clearly shown all the indicators of successful 
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growth suggested by Molotch (1976): an expanded labour force; a rising scale of retail 
and wholesale commerce; intensive land development; higher population density; and 
increased levels of financial activity. Unlike some major industrial cities in developed 
Western countries experiencing serious urban decay, Seoul has not undergone major 
urban deterioration; rather the city was challenged by an accelerated physical expansion 
and growth.  
 
The first state involvement in gentrification: 1960-70s  
Rapid population and urban growth has resulted in a severe shortage of land for 
development in Seoul. Especially during the 1960s and the 1970s, the population in 
Seoul increased by about half million people every two years under the unbalanced 
growth policy of the developmental state1.  As a result, chronic housing shortage has been 
the main problem in Seoul. The Korean government has focused on the expansion of 
housing supply to resolve the shortage. However spending on housing was a low priority 
for the Korean government until the mid-1980s. Housing statistics show that from 1970 
to 1990, the average housing supply ratio2 was 74 per cent in Korea and only 57 per cent 
in Seoul (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Housing stock (1970 – 2005) 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 
Households („000)      
- Korea 5,576 7,470 10,167 11,928 12,491 
- Seoul 1,029 1,724 2,518 2,548 2,588 
Housing stock („000)      
- Korea 4,360 5,319 7,357 11,472 12,491 
- Seoul 584 968 1,458 1,973 2,322 
Housing supply ratio (%)      
- Korea 78.2 71.2 72.4 96.2 105.9 
- Seoul 56.8 56.1 57.9 77.4 89.7 
Source: KNHC (2007)  
 
This quantitative shortage of housing contributed to the qualitative degradation of the 
housing situation in the 1960s and 1970s. A large number of substandard urban 
settlements, which could be characterised as „squatter settlements‟, were formed in the 
inner city areas, reaching the peak of some 200,000 units in 1970 (Kim 1998). It is 
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believed that approximately 30% of Seoulites made their homes in squatter settlements 
at this time (Kim, 2011). Seoul city government initiated a series of experimental housing 
redevelopment and urban renewal schemes, which concentrated on the clearance of 
squatter settlements. The history of „state-facilitated‟ gentrification can be traced back to 
these squatter clearance efforts. Urban redevelopment districts were first introduced in 
the Urban Planning Act of 1965. The city government led squatter clearance and 
redevelopment projects at this time and gentrification was seen in this process. Squatter 
areas in downtown were turned into high-end shopping arcades and mixed-use 
condominiums (Kim and Yoon, 2003; Sohn, 2003). The large-scale removal of squatters 
took place in the late 1960s and conflicts between the residents who strived to keep their 
place to live and the government that tried to remove the squatters were seen. Yet these 
gentrified areas were confined to the limited spots. The pace of this ambitious plan for 
the inner city squatter clearance slowed greatly in the mid-1970s. This was due to the 
lack of government funds as a result of the international oil embargo in 1973.  
 
The emergence of large-scale gentrification with an increased role of the private 
sector: 1980-90s 
 
Housing redevelopment and urban renewal policies took a radical turn in the 1980s. 
Central government promoted a greatly increased role for the private sector. Poor 
housing areas, including squatter settlements, were incorporated into the formal market. 
Housing and land prices in poor housing areas located in areas accessible to the city 
centre rose faster than in any other areas. The increase in land prices in poor 
neighbourhoods benefited some low-income households. It was a blessing for some in-
migrants who had built their houses illegally. It was under these circumstances that the 
government introduced a new scheme in 1983, known as „Joint Redevelopment‟ (Ha 
2004), which emphasised the role of the private sector and the community in housing 
renewal.  
 
The JR programme, which continues today, involves the formation of a voluntary 
contract between property owners, residents‟ associations, and developers, on the basis 
of absolute property rights. The government designates clearance areas and authorises 
building removal; development companies provide the capital; and property owners 
form an association to obtain the required approval of two-thirds of the property owners. 
Based on the approval, each member of the association is then provided with the right to 
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purchase a unit upon completion of construction. The property-owners‟ association 
officially takes responsibility for the project and makes a contract with the development 
company for the redevelopment of the area. The development company is allowed to 
build more units than is required to house all members of the property-owners‟ 
association, any excess units beyond the total required are then offered for sale on the 
open market. This arrangement is mainly justified on the understanding that reasonable 
profits should be realised by the development company involved. As a consequence, the 
city government does not have to drain its tight financial resources for such renewal 
projects. 
 
The introduction of the JR programme has brought significant improvements in both the 
quality and quantity of housing in Seoul. The number of JR projects has mushroomed 
with the high level of national economic growth and market demand. By the end of 2008, 
the total number of houses demolished by housing redevelopment projects was about 
124,000. Approximately twice this number, about 10 per cent of the total number of new 
housing units in Seoul, was constructed over the same period. Most of the squatter 
settlements in Seoul were eradicated and over this time, the nature of housing 
redevelopment programmes has changed from squatter clearance to more general 
residential redevelopment. The common housing type, a small-scale, single-story 
detached dwelling unit, occupied by multiple families, has been replaced by high-rise 
flats.  
 











Completed     
- Korea 379 16,178 140,483 292,288 
- Seoul 314 13,891 124,343 273,628 
In progress     
- Korea 179 10,716 65,278 166,809 
- Seoul 102 5,514 40,286 85,430 
Waiting     
- Korea 334 23,253 138,146 334,588 
- Seoul 137 8,659 65,827 133,323 
Total     
- Korea 892 50,148 343,907 793,685 
- Seoul 553 28,064 230,456 492,381 
Source: LHC (2009)  
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Even though this approach, in theory, seemed to be very attractive to all parties involved 
in the project - the local community, private sector and public sector - the reality has not 
been as effective as originally anticipated for the local community. The profit motive of 
the powerful developers does not mix well with the low socio-economic status of the 
affected residents. The needs of residents are not seen as the main considerations. When 
the JR programme was launched, no account was taken of the vulnerable social and 
financial position of tenants in redevelopment project areas. Many tenants experienced 
harassment and eviction in the course of redevelopment. There were constant protests 
from tenants who suffered a loss of affordable rental units. It was the late 1980s when 
the government revised the regulations to protect tenants in redevelopment areas. At 
that time, Korea began its transition to democratic rule and the government responded 
to constant political, civil and social unrest with compensatory and welfare oriented 
systems. Since then the residents‟ associations and the developers in the JR project areas 
have had to provide the relocation compensation and to build new rental housing for 
displaced tenants within the project areas. Despite the fact that the new rental housing 
covers only 30 per cent of rented households and the rents charged for the new housing 
are often beyond the means of the original tenants, the tenants‟ protests in JR project 
areas have greatly reduced since the introduction of the new rental housing scheme  
(Kim 2011).  
 
The original purpose of the JR programme – improvement of the living conditions for 
low-income families in the project areas - has shifted because of housing speculation and 
attracted more middle income families into the projects (Ha 2004; Kim 1998; Kim and 
Yoon 2003; Kyung 2006; Shin 2009). The mechanism of this profit making formula, as 
Shin (2009) argued, is well explained with the production-side explanation of 
gentrification, the rent-gap theory. There has been a high turnover of land ownership 
and the portion of the absentee landlord is believed to reach as much as 30 to 4o per cent 
(SDI and KOCER 2003). Property owners often choose to let the new unit or sell it in 
order to make a quick profit. According to SDI and KOCER (2003), only about 40 per 
cent of property owners and 10 per cent of tenants returned to redeveloped areas. 
Regardless of the government‟s intention, the JR programme has brought in 
gentrification. A social class change from the working class to the middle-class through 
large-scale housing redevelopment has been unmistakably seen in the JR projects areas.  
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In the mid 1990s, the pace of the JR programme slowed due to the government‟s massive 
housing development plan, the Two Million Housing Construction Plan in 1989. The 
requirement for the property-owners‟ association to build rental housing in JR project 
areas also contributed as it drove down profits for both property owners and developers 
(Kim and Ha 1998). The Asian Economic Crisis in 1997 additionally made it difficult to 
continue many JR projects.   
 
Globalisation and the changing nature of gentrification: After the Asian 
Economic Crisis 
 
The economic crisis temporarily halted residential redevelopment activities. Yet it 
resumed later, as stumbled housing prices soared again (Figure 1). The housing price 
increase was dramatic but sharp contrasts appeared between geographical areas within 
the city. This regional disparity within the city, which is a product of the rapid economic 
development since the 1960s, has been one of the challenging problems. Seoul has a 
deepening disparity between the older areas in the north of the city, Gangbuk, and newly 
developed areas in the south, Gangnam, in terms of local economy, educational 
environment, housing, and income. It consequently brings about gaps in financial 
capability and housing prices.  
 
 
Figure 1. Housing prices in Seoul and Korea (1987 – 2010) 
Source: Kookmin Bank, Statistics of Housing Market since 1987 
Conservative, growth-minded Lee Myung Bahk, now the nation‟s president, won the 































































































improve the quality of life in less developed areas, the city government launched the 
Regional Balanced Development Bureau in 2002. The main duties of the bureau were to 
formulate and coordinate initiatives on balanced regional development; to support 
reconstruction projects and the establishment of infrastructure facilities; to devise a plan 
to improve conventional markets; and to establish high-quality educational 
infrastructures. The „New Town‟ programme, so-called „New Town in Town‟, was also 
initiated, which is a much more aggressive housing redevelopment and urban renewal 
programme than the JR programme. The New Town programme emphasises a 
comprehensive development with a large-scale master plan. In the midst of the post-
financial crisis housing market boom, this programme was welcomed by many property 
owners of older areas, especially in Gangbuk. Between 2002 and 2008, there were three 
rounds in which New Town project areas were designated. In total, 26 areas covering 
23.8 square kilometres including about 850,000 people (about 8 per cent of the total 
population of Seoul) were designated. Among the total of 350,000 households, 69 per 
cent (240,000 households) were counted as tenants (Jang and Yang 2008).   
 
The city government has become an active enabler of the New Town programme, 
requesting the enactment of a new law to provide legal bases for the deregulation of the 
Urban Planning Law and the Building Code to attract the private sector; and special 
subsidies from the central government. The Special Promotion Act of Urban Renewal 
was legislated for the programme in 2006. This Act overrides the authorities of the 
existing urban planning and development related laws. It is notable that the Special 
Promotion Act encourages large-scale housing redevelopment and urban renewal. The 
criteria for the project area designation are not as tight as those for the JR programme: 
areas not previously considered deprived areas can now be designated. There are 
„renewal promotion districts‟ in the Newtown project areas, which seem similar to the 
„urban priority areas‟ in the UK or the „emergent renewal areas‟ in Japan. However, 
whilst these „urban priority‟ or „emergent renewal‟ areas are geared to promote 
regeneration under significant financial commitment from the central government 
(Kyung et al, 2009; Satoh, 2009), the central government‟s financial support in Korea is 
limited (Ha 2010; Kim 2010). Seoul city government has designated 241 renewal 
promotion districts in its 26 New Town project areas.  
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The New Town programme has become a model of housing redevelopment and urban 
renewal in other large cities in Korea. There are 339 districts designated as „renewal 
promotion districts‟ in the Seoul Metropolitan area. In some cases, as much as one-third 
of an inner city area is occupied by housing redevelopment projects. In the 2008 regional 
election, once again, the promise of a New Town programme type of redevelopment plan 
was a winning ticket for many Conservative party runners in the capital region as well as 
local large cities. Media named these pro-growth candidates „Newtowners,‟ and many 
Liberal-democrat candidates also joined this march of Newtowners. However, the New 
Town programme has not proceeded well as the housing market has slowed since 2006 
(Figure 1). While the Korean economy has recovered from the recent Global Financial 
Crisis in advance of other countries, many real estate projects including the New Town 
projects have been stopped or cancelled. Many property owners in Seoul and other large 
cities have requested that projects are cancelled as they realise they are unable to provide 
the cash required for completion. The private sector has also found it difficult to finance 
the projects. The New Town projects can no longer make the windfall profits that 
property owners expected.  
 
There are striking similarities between the JR programme and the New Town 
programme. As Ha (2010) and Kim (2010) argued, in the New Town project areas, the 
returning rate of the local residents is actually lower than the JR programme, about 20 
per cent; and the number of affordable small-sized housing units has decreased. Thanks 
to the Special Promotion Act 2006, the property owners and the private developers have 
developed large-size housing units to maximise the profit. The result is that few 
affordable houses are available after completion (see Kim 2010, p.81). There are also not 
sufficient rental houses for tenants and the rents are often too high for them. However, 
interviews conducted by the author in the New Town areas between 2008 and 2010 
show that tenants acknowledged the need for redevelopment even though this would 
mean they would be displaced. Consequently, few aggressive protests against the 
projects have been witnessed.   
 
Understanding the dynamics of gentrification: The roles of the public sector, 
private sector and community in a gentrification process  
 
As discussed, the history of gentrification in Seoul can be divided into three waves: state-
led gentrification, squatter clearance in the 1960s and the 1970s; large-scale state-
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facilitated gentrification, JR programme in the 1980s and the 1990s; and much bigger-
scale of state-facilitated gentrification, New Town programme in the 2000s.   
 
In the first wave, the state actually led gentrification by initiating, planning and funding 
downtown renewal projects. Various approaches were taken by Seoul city government to 
alleviate the substandard housing problems but the city‟s squatter removal plan was 
largely unfulfilled. Most projects were small in scale, due to the lack of financial support 
from the government (Ha 1987; Kim 1997; Kim and Choe 1997). Consequently, the scale 
of gentrification was insignificant. Two reasons can be found for this: the first, 
gentrification was mainly isolated to small state-led downtown renewal projects to clear 
squatter areas; and the second, borrowing Smith‟s view (1996), the middle or upper-
middle class, possible gentrifiers, was not sizable enough to be able to invade gentrifiable 
areas. 
 
In the 1980s and the 1990s, gentrification became a common phenomenon in large-scale 
housing redevelopment and urban renewal areas. This was closely related to the 
changing socioeconomic profiles of Korea. After two decades of state-led 
industrialisation, a sizable body of the middle- or upper-middle class emerged in the 
social strata of a much expanded population pool. The population in Seoul grew from 2.5 
million in 1960 to 8.4 million in 1980 to 10.4 million in 2000. At the same interval, the 
GDP per capita in Korea grew from US$ 156 in 1960; to 1,674 in 1980; to 10,884 in 2000 
with annual average growth rate of 8-9 per cent (Kim 2011). Seoul served as the hub for 
this economic growth: its GDP per capita reached US $ 13,741 and about 30 per cent of 
working population was classified as professional in 2000. With this economic and 
population growth, housing prices in Seoul continued to rise until 2007. There were 
three occasions when this was not the case (Figure 1). The first was in 1991, which was 
due to the Two Million Housing Construction Plan initiated two years earlier; the second 
was the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997; and the third was the government‟s strong anti-
speculation measures for real estate in 2003. Despite high output for home-ownership, 
the average owner-occupation rate in Seoul was only 40 per cent from 1985 to 2000. As a 
result, housing came to be seen as an attractive investment option. Consequently, the 
potential gentrifiers, who were materially fulfilled, created an explosive demand for 
decent homes that had unfailingly demonstrated a great asset for later sale. The 
government‟s home-ownership promotion policy for maintaining social stability and 
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economic growth also provided favourable conditions for construction companies and 
homebuyers including a pre-sale housing system and cheap loans.  
 
Having attempted, up until the early 1980s, to meet the housing needs in squatter areas 
through state-direct production of low-cost housing, the government had come to realise 
that the public sector should not attempt to assume the role of housing provider. It 
recognized that demand-orientation, competition, and accountability might be more 
readily achieved through the involvement of the private sector as the government had 
insufficient resources to play a major role in housing redevelopment and urban renewal. 
Since then the government has promoted a multi-sectoral partnership programme to 
deal with the substandard settlements. In this sense, the Korean government‟s approach 
is parallel to Neoliberal policy, which seeks the mobilisation and extension of market 
mechanisms to alleviate economic and social problems. Shibata (2008) already argued 
that the Neoliberal state and the Developmental state had profound similarities in their 
beliefs, using the case of neoliberal planning strategy in Japan.  
 
In the second wave of gentrification, therefore, the role of the state lessened from an 
active orchestrator of gentrification in the 1970s. The public sector focused on 
supporting the private sector and local community in the gentrification process. The city 
government facilitated gentrification through the designation of renewal areas.  Property 
owners executed gentrification through a partnership with private developers providing 
capital. The private sector was more actively involved as a partner in the gentrification 
process. The leadership of the residents‟ associations played a vital role in the 
organisation of all urban redevelopment projects. One of the primary functions of the 
association was to represent the community in dealing with the public sector as well as 
the private sector. But only property owners could join the association, hence there was 
often tension between tenants, who had no input in the redevelopment process, and the 
property owners. The conflicts in the first wave, mainly between the state and the 
residents, changed to battles between the property owners who desired to make profits 
and the tenants who struggled to keep or find a place to live.  
 
With the government‟s massive housing development plan, as well as the Asian 
Economic crisis, gentrification slowed its pace in the mid-1990s. This stagnation 
continued to the early 2000s because of the impact of the economic crisis in Asia. After 
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the economic recession, however, gentrification returned on a much larger scale of 
housing development and urban renewal programme. Gentrification became an 
important item on the government‟s urban policy and political agenda. It was 
comparable to the Labour government‟s urban policy in the UK, „Urban Renaissance‟. To 
many critics (Allen 2008; Cameron 2006; Lees 2003; 2008; MacLeod 2002), the Labour 
government‟s urban policy and practices often encouraged the process of gentrification. 
As Lees pointed out,  
“… it [gentrification] is increasingly promoted in policy circles both in Europe and 
North America on the assumption that it will lead to less segregated and more 
sustainable communities” (2008, 2449).  
The state promoted gentrification aggressively by enacting the Special Promotion Act 
2006. The public sector attempted to maximise the opportunities to attract private 
investment in order to fund property development. It seems that the government 
pursued Neoliberal policy further than in the second wave as, borrowing an expression of 
Brenner and Theodore (2002, 21), Seoul became „an institutional laboratory for a 
Neoliberal policy experiment‟. In the third wave, the state and the private sector took 
much bigger roles whilst the role of community remained the same as in the second wave. 
Many residents who actually lived in gentrified areas, tenants, had no influence over 
decisions that affected their lives. It may have been the middle-class households, 
possessing economic and cultural capital in the market, who Seoul city government 











































































































































































































The historical development of gentrification in Seoul, Korea is quite different from its 
counterpart of Western cities. Gentrification was first noticed in the process of state-led 
downtown renewal projects to clear squatter areas in the 1960s and the 1970s. It became 
significant in the 1980s with the state‟s promotion of the home-ownership scheme for 
the middle-class. Gentrification was apparent in the development of state-facilitated 
housing redevelopment being led by property owners and large developers. After the 
Asian Economic Crisis in the late 1990s, the scale of gentrification expanded significantly. 
The state was more actively involved in the gentrification process and the private sector 
played a bigger role.  
 
Unlike Western countries, this state-facilitated gentrification in Seoul has led to mass 
displacement of the original residents of the gentrified urban districts. This mass 
displacement, however, has been due to the activities of the original residents, mostly 
working class property owners, who gentrify their own neighbourhoods with a strong 
desire for making windfall profits. They pursue gentrification through a partnership with 
the private sector and institutional support from the public sector. This Korean process 
of gentrification is in contrast to the Western gentrification theory that considers the 
outside middle class as a „gentrifier‟.  
 
There was serious collective action against gentrification in the 1980s. But it has reduced 
considerably since the early 1990s with the introduction of the rental housing scheme as 
well as increased compensation for tenants. It has been noticed, especially in the third 
wave of gentrification, that tenants also accept the need for redevelopment and, 
therefore, their main concern is receiving proper compensation in order to find a new 
place to live rather than organising demonstrations to keep their current community.  
 
In recent years, the traditional „market-based‟ form of gentrification in Western 
countries has emerged in Korea, especially in Seoul. In some old parts of Seoul including 
historic areas, and university districts, traditional houses are being renovated and 
reconstructed one by one by young artists or professionals. These areas have turned into 
chic neighbourhoods where trendy shops and cafés are flourishing. Although the city 
government takes initial action through its funding programs for historic preservation 
and cultural promotion, it is largely the market process that serves the changing 
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locational preferences of the new social class. The socio-economic transformation of 
Korean society due to the impact of globalisation has created favourable conditions for 
potential gentrifiers who appreciate and enjoy cultural aspects of urban living, which was 
found in the first wave of gentrification in the West. This converse development of 
gentrification in Seoul can be explained by its inherited physical condition, rampant 
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Note 
 
1 Kwon (2006) denied the widely accepted view that Korea‟s rapid economic growth of the 1960s 
and the 1970s under the authoritarian regime of Park Chung-Hee could be explained by the 
developmental state theory. According to him, the key notion of the developmental state theory 
lied on the state-led economic growth with market-friendly policies. Kwon argued that it was by 
Korea‟s unique growth strategy of the dictatorial government, since bona fide market economy 
did not exist in the 1960s and the 1970s. Nonetheless, this paper takes the view of developmental 
state theory as it still has a power in understanding of the state-led economic growth of some of 
Asian nations including South Korea.  
 
2 Housing supply ratio=(dwellings/households)×100 
 
